We consider a particular instance of a stochastic multi-leader multi-follower equilibrium problem in which players compete in the forward and spot markets in successive periods. Proving the existence of such equilibria has proved difficult as has the construction of globally convergent algorithms for obtaining such points. By conjecturing a relationship between forward and spot decisions, we co...

Title of dissertation: BEYOND SIMPLE SIMILARITY: THE RELATIONSHIP OF LEADER-FOLLOWER PERSONALITY FIT WITH FOLLOWER SATISFACTION WITH THE LEADER AND FOLLOWER COMMITMENT TO THE ORGANIZATION Jessica Lynne Saltz, Doctor of Philosophy, 2004 Dissertation directed by: Dr. Katherine J. Klein Department of Psychology This dissertation examines the relationship of leader-follower personality similarity (...

Recent applications of game theory in security domains use algorithms to solve a Stackelberg model, in which one player (the leader) first commits to a mixed strategy and then the other player (the follower) observes that strategy and bestresponds to it. However, in real-world applications, it is hard to determine whether the follower is actually able to observe the leader’s mixed strategy befo...

Two-player Stackelberg games and their applications to security are currently a very hot topic in the field of Algorithmic Game Theory [7]. In two-player Stackelberg games, instead of having the players move simultaneously, one player is designated as the leader and one as the follower. The game then works as follows: the leader chooses a strategy (possibly mixed) to commit to which the followe...

data envelopment analysis (dea) and balanced scorecard (bsc) are two well-known approaches for measuring performance of decision making units (dmus). bsc is especially applied with quality measures, whereas, when the quantity measures are used to evaluate, dea is more appropriate. in the real-world, dmus usually have complex structures such as network structures. one of the well-known network s...

In the competitive p-median problem, two decision makers, the leader and the follower, compete to attract clients from a given market. The leader opens his facilities, anticipating that the follower will react to the decision by opening his/her own facilities. The leader and the follower try to maximize their own profits. This is the Stackelberg game. We present it as a linear bilevel 0–1 probl...

Improper disposal of household unwanted medications (UMs) is an emergency problem around the world that adversely affects the sustainability of the environment and human’s health. However, the current disposal practices, mainly based on advertising and collecting status, are unsatisfactory in most countries and regions. Thus, some scholars proposed an alternative disposal practice that is to pr...

The intent of this research is to generate a set of non-dominated policies from which one of two agents (the leader) can select a most preferred policy to control a dynamic system that is also affected by the control decisions of the other agent (the follower). The problem is described by an infinite horizon, partially observed Markov game (POMG). The actions of the agents are selected simultan...

Although leader-follower games have been around for quite some time in economics and game theory, their integration into the realm of optimization and operations research is recent. In this paper, we provide an overview of research in bilevel programming that was initiated at the University of Montreal and led to a large scale application in the field of revenue management.

Leader-follower (LF) equilibria play a central role in several applications of game theory. In spite of this, the literature only presents sporadic results for the case with two or more followers. In this work, we address the problem of computing LF equilibria in this setting, assuming that the followers play a Nash Equilibrium after the leader’s commitment.