In this paper, a discount model is proposed to coordinate pricing and ordering decisions in a two-echelon supply chain (SC). Demand is stochastic and price sensitive while lead times are fixed. Decentralized decision making where downstream decides on selling price and order size is investigated. Then, joint pricing and ordering decisions are extracted where both members act as a single entity ...

In this paper, the coordination of pricing and periodic review inventory decisions in a supplier-retailer supply chain (SC) is proposed. In the investigated SC, the retailer faces a stochastic price dependent demand and determines the review period, order-up-to-level, and retail price. On the other hand, the supplier decides on the replenishment multiplier. Firstly, the decentralized and centra...

Supply chain coordination has become a critical success factor for supply chain management (SCM). In the past few years, the researchers have widely emphasized that cooperation among supply chain (SC) firms is a key source of competitive advantage. This paper is focused on supply chain coordination from the perspective of inventory management. Li and Liu [1] developed a model for illustrating h...

Supply chain coordination has become a critical success factor for supply chain management (SCM). In the past few years, the researchers have widely emphasized that cooperation among supply chain (SC) firms is a key source of competitive advantage. This paper is focused on supply chain coordination from the perspective of inventory management. Li and Liu [1] developed a model for illustrating h...

T This paper analyzes different pricing strategies in a two-echelon supply chain including one supplier and two retailers. The supplier and the retailers face random yield and random demand, respectively. Moreover, coordination or non-coordination of retailers in receiving the discount is investigated. Game theory is used to model and analyze the problems. The supplier as a leader of Stackelbe...

We consider a newsvendor problem in a supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader and the retailer is the follower.We examine how themanufacturer can contract awholesale-price-only agreementwith its retailer thatmaximizes its profit.We also propose a returns policy with a wholesale-price-discount scheme (returns-discount contract) that...

This article develops a dynamic game model of a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer to study the coordination mechanism and the effect of demand disruption on the coordination mechanism, where the market demand is sensitive to retail price and service. We assume that the supplier and the retailer only know the distribution of the disrupted amount after the demand disrup...

The ordering model between single supplier and multi-retailers under the circumstance of non-cooperation supply chain is discussed in this paper, an improved linear price discount strategy is also provided. This strategy considers two situations of incremental discount and decremental discount at the same time. Moreover, Stackelberg game model of both parties’ order on supply and demand is give...

The paper considers a two-echelon supply chain where a supplier determines his production quantity and a retailer chooses her order size and retail price for each period in an infinite horizon. Under a price-discount sharing (PDS) scheme, the supplier’s wholesale price linearly depends on the retail price. We develop a stochastic game in which these two supply chain members maximize their disco...

In this paper we study the coordination of the two-echelon supply chain using credit and quantity discount options. We determine the retail price, order quantity for the buyer, and the setup frequency, credit period for the supplier in four different scenarios (with or without coordination and with or without credit option). And we suggest a policy that incorporates both quantity discount and c...