Consider Holmström’s moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has an ai-dimensional strategy space and output is m-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satis…es budget balance, limited liability and implements an e¢ cient allocation generically exists if and only if Pn i=1 ai=(n 1) < m. Moreover, under a weak additional condition, the equilibrium im...

1 Utilizing rich data on nearly 11,000 educators over 17 academic years in a highly diverse context, we examine the career paths of teachers to determine whether and when they transition into the principalship. We utilize a variety of event history analyses, including discrete-time hazard modeling, to determine how an individual’s race, gender, and their combination among other characteristics ...

I investigate the interaction between international trade and national institutional development in an environment characterized by heterogeneous individuals choosing their education levels to maximize their utilities; and institutions alleviating moral hazard by allowing managers to better observe and verify the productive efforts of workers. Liberalized trade allows institutions to serve as i...

∗Department of Economics, Michigan State University; [email protected]. All errors are our own.

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This paper studies incentives provision when agents are characterized either by homo moralis preferences, i.e., their utility is represented by a convex combination of selfish preferences and Kantian morality, or by altruism. In a moral hazard in a team setting with two agents whose efforts affect output stochastically, I demonstrate that the power of extrinsic incentives decreases with the deg...