This study focuses on mechanism design in order to solve multi-attribute e-procurement problems. In particularly, this study addresses two realistic requirements in mechanism design: (1) specifications of request/proposal on multiple attributes, and (2) incentive compatibility on information exchange/disclosure. Taking into account the needs and emergence of advanced mechanisms in eprocurement,...

In the unlimited-supply profit-maximizing pricing problem, we are given the consumers’ consideration sets and know their purchase strategy (e.g. buy the cheapest items). The goal is to price the items to maximize the revenue. Previous studies suggest that this problem is too general to obtain even a sublinear approximation ratio (in terms of the number of items) even when the consumers are rest...

Currently researchers in the field of personalized recommendations bear little consideration on users’ interest differences in resource attributes although resource attribute is usually one of the most important factors in determining user preferences. To solve this problem, the paper builds an evaluation model of user interest based on resource multi-attributes, proposes a modified Pearson-Com...

In this paper, we develop a secure multi-attribute procurement auction, in which a sales item is defined by several attributes called qualities, the buyer is the auctioneer (e.g., a government), and the sellers are the bidders. We first present a Vickrey-type protocol that can be used for multi-attribute procurement auctions. Next, we show how this protocol can be executed securely. key words :...