نتایج جستجو برای: nash equilibrium

تعداد نتایج: 134259  

2017
Julian Gutierrez Paul Harrenstein Giuseppe Perelli Michael Wooldridge

Game theory provides a well-established framework for the analysis of concurrent and multi-agent systems. The basic idea is that concurrent processes (agents) can be understood as corresponding to players in a game; plays represent the possible computation runs of the system; and strategies define the behaviour of agents. Typically, strategies are modelled as functions from sequences of system ...

2003
Richard Loulou

An example of game theory is the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma. Suppose you and a friend are arrested for robbery. You are put in separate cells. The police lack sufficient evidence to convict either of you, so they try to get one of you to testify against each other. The police tell you that if you testify against your friend, you will be released, provided your friend does not testify against yo...

Journal: :Games and Economic Behavior 2011
Sergiu Hart

Article history: Received 4 October 2010 Available online 9 November 2010 JEL classification: C70 C72 C73

Dynamic game theory is applied to analyze the timber market in northern Iran as a duopsony. The Nash equilibrium and the dynamic properties of the system based on marginal adjustments are determined. When timber is sold, the different mills use mixed strategies to give sealed bids. It is found that the decision probability combination of the different mills follow a special form of attractor an...

2010
Jihong Lee Hamid Sabourian

This paper examines repeated implementation of a social choice function (SCF) with infinitely-lived agents whose preferences are determined randomly in each period. An SCF is repeated-implementable in Nash equilibrium if there exists a sequence of (possibly history-dependent) mechanisms such that (i) its Nash equilibrium set is non-empty and (ii) every Nash equilibrium outcome corresponds to th...

Journal: :J. Economic Theory 2016
Daniil Musatov Alexei Savvateev Shlomo Weber

This paper examines Nash jurisdictional stability in a model with a continuum of agents whose characteristics are distributed over a unidimensional interval. Communal benefits and costs of each individual depend on her identity and the composition of the community which she belongs to. Since the framework is too general to yield an existence of Nash equilibrium, we introduce the essentiality of...

Journal: :CoRR 2016
Stefanos Leonardos Costis Melolidakis

Given a bimatrix game, the associated leadership or commitment games are defined as the games at which one player, the leader, commits to a (possibly mixed) strategy and the other player, the follower, chooses his strategy after having observed the irrevocable commitment of the leader. Based on a result by von Stengel and Zamir [2010], the notions of commitment value and commitment optimal stra...

2014
Yichao Zhang M. A. Aziz-Alaoui Cyrille Bertelle Jihong Guan

Nash equilibrium is widely present in various social disputes. As of now, in structured static populations, such as social networks, regular, and random graphs, the discussions on Nash equilibrium are quite limited. In a relatively stable static gaming network, a rational individual has to comprehensively consider all his/her opponents' strategies before they adopt a unified strategy. In this s...

2003
Michele Piccione Ariel Rubinstein

In the jungle, power and coercion govern the exchange of resources. We study a simple, stylized model of the jungle that mirrors an exchange economy. We define the notion of jungle equilibrium and demonstrate that a number of standard results of competitive markets hold in the jungle. JEL Classification: C7, D4, S477, B201

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