Zheng has proposed a seller-optimal auction for (asymmetric) independent-privatevalue environments where inter-bidder resale is possible. Zheng’s construction requires novel conditions—Resale Monotonicity, Transitivity, and Invariance—on the bidders’ value distribution profile. The only known examples of distribution profiles satisfying these conditions in environments with three or more bidder...

Zheng Xu1∗, Mário A. T. Figueiredo2, Xiaoming Yuan3, Christoph Studer 4, Tom Goldstein1 1Department of Computer Science, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 2Instituto de Telecomunicações, Instituto Superior Técnico, Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal 3Department of Mathematics, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong 4Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Cornell ...