This paper analyzes price elasticities in the Austrian market for mobile telecommunications services using data on firm specific tariffs. Both static and a dynamic panel data approaches lead to consistent results which provide evidence for a relatively elastic demand. Furthermore, some basic facts on the Austrian mobile telephone sector are presented. JEL-Classification: C23, L13, L96.

The optimal design of input prices is analyzed in a simple setting where the regulator has limited knowledge of efficient production costs. Under some conditions, input prices are optimally set equal to expected efficient production costs, as under the Federal Communications Commission’s TELRIC pricing policy in the U.S. telecommunications industry. More generally, input prices optimally reflec...

In this paper we review, and draw some lessons from, the UMTS-auctions that have taken place in Europe during 2000 and 2001. We address several design issues and, in particular, focus attention on asymmetries between the bidders and on possibilities for collusion. An outlook is provided to several other auctions in which the stakes may not be so high, but the design issues perhaps somewhat more...

I estimate a logistic model of mobile communications diffusion to examine the impact of competition on cellular penetration in former socialist countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Not surprisingly, I find that the introduction of competition led to a higher speed of adoption of mobile technology. Perhaps more surprisingly, sequential competition had a greater impact than simultaneous ...

We analyse competition between two retailers of broadband access when they differ in their ability to offer value-added services. One retailer is vertically integrated and controls the input-market for local access. This firm invests to increase the input quality (upgrading to broadband) before an access price regulation is set. We first show that access price regulation may lower consumer surp...

We examine how universal service provisions and price restrictions across markets impact strategic entry and pricing. We develop a simple multi-market model with an oligopolistic (profitable) urban market and entry auctions for (unprofitable) rural service. Cross-market price restrictions induce a firm operating in both markets to become a ‘softer’ competitor, thus placing the firm at a strateg...

This paper investigates the relationship between telecommunications infrastructure competition, investment and productivity. Using econometric modelling and input-output economics, the analysis examines and measures the extent to which telecommunications has contributed to national and sectoral productivity performance. The main findings from this paper suggests that most industries have benefi...

We examine the interaction between two interconnected networks (e.g., two local exchange carriers (LECs)) and a third network (e.g., an interexchange carrier (IXC)) seeking access to their customer base. The IXC could either interconnect with both LECs or interconnect with only one LEC and transit calls to the other LEC via the first LEC s network. We show that there is a wide set of cases in w...

The paper reviews how the question of access pricing has been fully investigated by the theoretical literature in a static context. On the other hand, there is no developed analysis of the linkage between access pricing and incentives to invest. This paper argues that some useful literature in related areas can be brought to bear on the issue of ‘‘races’’ to build infrastructures, on the relati...

I study the implications of exclusive contracts for smartphones. Theory models indicate that lower demand elasticities for handsets relative to wireless networks could lead to exclusive contracts maximizing joint profits of the contracting parties. I estimate smartphone and carrier demand on a detailed monthly market-level dataset of US consumer decisions over 2008-2010. Counterfactual simulati...