in iran’s system of tripartite collective bargaining, does the wage-policy maker consistently react optimally to the best move made by the exchange rate-policy maker (nash-rule) or only to the state of economy (non-nash rule)?. this paper not only investigates the nature of the political game (nash rule against non-nash rule) but also estimates some structural parameters by using 2sls method an...

Policy makers make policy decisions, which affect the utility of private citizens. The traditional explanation for government intervention in the economy is the existence of market failure. Nevertheless, despite public policy interventions, the economy may fail to reach the efficient frontier. Hence, unless we suppose that efficient policies are not feasible (second and third best arguments), w...

In this paper, we study the Nash dynamics of strategic interplays of n buyers in a matching marketsetup by a seller, the market maker. Taking the standard market equilibrium approach, upon receivingsubmitted bid vectors from the buyers, the market maker will decide on a price vector to clear themarket in such a way that each buyer is allocated an item for which he desires the most (...

the aim of this research is consider the importance of decision maker level of analysis in the study of foreign policy. this capability created by the regard to the role of man in foreign policy and international relations theories. however, the main research question is whether the decision maker level of analysis will be the theoretical support for the analysis of foreign policy and what are ...

This paper offers an explanation for why policy makers stick to inefficient policy decisions. I argue that repealing a policy is a bad signal to voters about the policy maker’s competence if voters do not have complete knowledge about the effects of implemented policies. I derive the optimal policy maker’s decision on continuation of a policy, assuming that voters’ beliefs about the policy make...

This paper proposes a theoretical model for the decision of voter registration, which recovers the classical notion that democracy is a public good. The solution of the citizen’s problem implies three types of Nash equilibrium (null, partial, and full enrollment), where the real cost for voter enrollment and appreciation for democracy are the key variables. In the partial-enrollment equilibrium...

This paper establishes, in the context of the Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy with production, that the risk that savings in unbacked assets (like fiat money or public debt) become worthless implies that, not only the first-best steady state, but even the best steady state attainable with those saving instruments fails to be a competitive equilibrium outcome under laissez-faire. ...

A market maker sets prices over time for wagers that pay out contingent on the future state of the world. The market maker has knowledge of the probability of realizing each state of the world, and of how the price of a bet affects the probability that traders will accept it. We compare the optimal policy for risk-neutral (expected utility maximizing) and Kelly criterion (expected log-utility m...

This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium outcomes in an environment where market participants play a coordination game with information heterogeneity. We consider defense policies against speculative currency attacks in a model where speculators observe the fundamentals with idiosyncratic noise. The policy maker is willing to take a costly policy action only for ...