For schools to be desirable places in which to work, it is necessary for principals to recognise their teachers’ emotions, and be sensitive to their needs. This necessitates that principals are capable to correctly identify their emotionally intelligent behaviours (EIBs) they need to use in order to be successful leaders. They also need to have knowledge of their emotional intelligence and be a...

This paper considers dynamic games in which multiple principals contract sequentially and noncooperatively with the same agent. We first show that when contracting is private, i.e. when downstream principals do not observe the mechanisms offered upstream and the decisions taken in these mechanisms, all PBE outcomes can be characterized through pure-strategy profiles in which the principals offe...

In a laboratory investigation of a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard, we analyse strategically induced discrimination. We isolate the influence of the strategic environment from the e↵ects of other sources of discrimination, including group statistics and taste for discrimination. We find that, in a strategic setting, principals who reward agents contingent on agent-generated outco...

It is often argued that an agent making decisions on behalf of two or more principals who have different utility functions should adopt a {\em Pareto-optimal} policy, i.e., a policy that cannot be improved upon for one agent without making sacrifices for another. A famous theorem of Harsanyi shows that, when the principals have a common prior on the outcome distributions of all policies, a Pare...

The network addresses of principals in a mobile ad hoc network (MANET) are conventionally assumed to be public information. This may cause devastating consequences for MANETs deployed in hostile environments. For example, attackers can easily locate a target principal based his known network address and then launch a pinpoint attack. This paper identifies address privacy as a new security requi...

This qualitative study was designed to provide insight into effective behaviors and competencies of building principals in which leadership is broadly shared under the concept of empowerment. Principals and teacher leaders responded to five essential questions regarding what works, what does not work, the incentives, and the costs of principal leadership behaviors under empowerment paradigms. E...

For the game of complete information with multiple principals and multiple common agents discussed by Prat and Rustichini (2003), we construct a general set of equilibrium transfers which implement any efficient outcome as a weakly truthful equilibrium, and the subset of such equilibria that are Pareto optimal for the principals. We provide conditions under which the general set completely char...

Economic actors are usually assumed to enter into principal-agent relationships due to efficiency gains from comparative advantage. This research explores whether such relationships may also arise because they allow principals to obtain a selfish, inequitable outcome without behaving themselves in an explicitly selfish manner. An experiment is reported in which principals either decide repeated...

Introduction The study upon which this paper is based solicited information on school renewal from a purposive sample of principals initially identified using quantitative profiling techniques (Silcox, Cavanagh and Dellar, 2003). Principals were presented with a series of questions that enabled an investigation of their leadership behaviours with respect to school renewal. The principals' respo...

This paper examines how the presence of a non-negligible fraction of reciprocally fair actors changes the provision of incentives through contracts. We provide experimental evidence that principals have a strong preference for less complete contracts although the standard self-interest model predicts that they should prefer the more complete contract. Our theoretical analysis shows that fairnes...