In this paper, we initiate a study on optimal control problem for stochastic differential games under generalized expectation via backward stochastic differential equations and partial information. We first prove a sufficient maximum principle for zero-sum stochastic differential game problem. And then extend our approach to general stochastic differential games (nonzero–sum games), and obtain ...

Under the notable Issacs’s condition on the Hamiltonian, the existence results of a saddle point are obtained for the stochastic recursive zero-sum differential game and mixed differential game problem, that is, the agents can also decide the optimal stopping time. Themain tools are backward stochastic differential equations BSDEs and double-barrier reflected BSDEs. As the motivation and applic...

I study a class of differential games of pollution control with profit functions that are polynomial in the global pollution stock. Given an emissions path satisfying mild regularity conditions, a simple polynomial ambient transfer scheme is exhibited that induces it in Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE). Proposed transfers are a polynomial function of the difference between actual and desired po...

We investigate a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which the players have an asymmetric information on the random payoff. We prove that the game has a value and characterize this value in terms of dual solutions of some second order Hamilton-Jacobi equation. Key-words : stochastic differential game, asymmetric information, viscosity solution. A.M.S. classification : 49N70, 49L...

Today green supply chain management (GSCM) has received increasing emphasis, as a kind of modern management mode which takes environmental impact and resource efficiency into a comprehensive consideration within the entire supply chain. In this paper, the government’s subsidy in the green supply chain for home appliances industry is studied by constructing a three-player game model among govern...

This paper is concerned with a new type of differential game problems of forward-backward stochastic systems. There are three distinguishing features: Firstly, our game systems are forward-backward doubly stochastic differential equations, which is a class of more general game systems than other forward-backward stochastic game systems without doubly stochastic terms; Secondly, forward equation...

We analyze a zero-sum stochastic differential game between two competing players who can choose unbounded controls. The payoffs of the game are defined through backward stochastic differential equations. We prove that each player’s priority value satisfies a weak dynamic programming principle and thus solves the associated fully non-linear partial differential equation in the viscosity sense.