This paper studies corporate tax competition if it is costly to learn some of the elements that determine the e¤ective tax burden. Search cost may, but need not, eliminate the tax competition pressure. The outcome depends on the boundaries of tax rate and tax base choices. Search cost can explain the empirically observed tax cuts cum base broadening. Keywords: Costly search, tax competition, co...

This paper explores the effects of a goods and services tax on the degree of competition in an oligopolistic industry and identifies a new mechanism through which the tax influences product market competition. The analysis focuses upon the effects of the tax in a concentrated industry and it is demonstrated that there exist circumstances under which the tax may promote competition by rendering ...

In this paper, we analyze tax competition in a model where investor firms have the choice between two types of investment, greenfield investment and mergers and acquisitions. We show that the coexistence of these two types of investment intensifies tax competition in comparison to the case where there is only greenfield investment. If a specific tax on acquisitions is available, this result cha...

Tax competition for a mobile factor is different in ‘new economic geography settings’ compared to standard tax competition models. The agglomeration rent which accrues to the mobile factor in the core region can be taxed. Moreover, a tax differential between the core and the periphery can be maintained. The present paper reexamines this issue in a setting which, in addition to the core-peripher...

While much has been written about inter-jurisdictional competition for tax revenues, especially concerning the choice between harmonization and competition, the literature has largely ignored intrajurisdiction issues. The few articles examining this issue focus on how lower level governmental entities react to the tax decisions of a national government. However, in some instances, multiple co-e...

This note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition. Regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor. Individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital. Even though a lump sum tax is available, the equilibrium capital tax in a jurisdiction may be positive. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will be true if the median capit...

This paper analyses tax competition and tax coordination in a model where capital flows occur in the form of mergers and acquisitions, rather than greenfield investment. In this framework, we show that differences in residence based taxes do not necessarily distort international ownership patterns. Moreover, tax competition yields globally efficient levels of source based corporate income taxes...

This article investigates the effect of the intensity of political competition on the tax choices by local governments. More precisely, we study whether local governments determine their tax rates more in a Leviathan way, exploiting a low political competition to vote high tax rates, or in a partisan way, fiscal choices by leftwing governments being significantly in contrast with those by right...

This paper analyzes a Tiebout / tax-competition model, where heterogeneity of consumer preferences is introduced into a standard tax-competition framework. Following the modern Tiebout tradition, consumer sorting in the model is achieved through the activities of profit-maximizing community developers. Once sorting is achieved, the equilibrium is equivalent to that in a standard tax-competition...

Taxing capital in open economies su¤ers from a rather wasteful tax competition. According to Konrad & Schjelderup (1999) harmonizing capital income taxes within a subgroup of countries is bene…cial to all countries. Although economists and politicians advocate a coordinated tax policy within a federation or a federal system like the EU they favor national tax sovereignty over a harmonization of...