Tax evasion is modeled as a risky activity and integrated into a standard problem of optimal tax design. It is shown that there is a trade off between reducing tax evasion and reducing tax distortion. Thus it is efficient to supplement a broad-based wage tax by a tax on specific consumption if the former is evaded and the latter not. The optimal tax structure can be characterized by an explicit...

In a two-stage public goods experiment, we study the effect that subjects’ possibility of contributing to a public good in the first stage of the game has on the voluntary contributions to the second public good. Our results show that subjects do not follow either the Nash strategy or the Pareto efficient strategy and that they perceive the two public goods as substitutes. JEL Classification: A...

This paper presents a game theoretic model in which some fraction of output is appropriated from entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are able to form a league to prevent this appropriation, but this might not be individually rational because of either the free rider problem or coordination failure. The model also shows that poorer countries are less able to form this league and so might not be able to...

In a two-stage public goods experiment, we study the framing effect due to the adoption of a cultural context. Our results show a slight increase in the allocations of subjects’ endowments to the cultural good when the cultural context is implemented in the laboratory. In particular, in one treatment, the framing effect has a strong impact in the last two periods only. JEL Classification: A13, ...

s tructural change is defined as a change in the relative weight of the important constituents of the macro-economic indicator such as production, taxes, imports and exports, workforce etc. since the structure change is one of the main reasons for the growth and economic development of countries, the investigation of the trend of changes in economic important constituents is important. tax as a...

In the presence of spillovers, decentralized provision of local public goods may lead to a higher surplus than centralized provision even though localities have identical preferences. Indeed, free-riding costs associated to decentralization can be lower than the costs of rent-seeking and influence activities under centralization. Actually, centralization yields a higher level of regional surplu...

That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a wellestablished observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Applying stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for...

We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy. We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action. JEL Classificatio...

Do corporate inversions cost the US Treasury billions of dollars in tax revenue, justifying legislative responses and even strong-arming corporations from moving their tax domicile abroad? We show that corporate inversions not only do not appear to reduce, but, paradoxically, are even likely to increase tax collections by the US Treasury. JEL classification: M40, G34, H25, F23

We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy. We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action. JEL Classificatio...