We consider a game theoretic framework to analyze traffic in a congested network, where a profit-maximizing monopolist sets prices for different routes. Each link in the network is associated with a flow-dependent latency function which specifies the time needed to traverse the link given its congestion. Users have utility functions defined over the amount of data flow transmitted, the delays t...

We study extreme Nash equilibria in the context of a selfish routing game. Specifically, we assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over m parallel identical links, to control the routing of its own assigned traffic. In a Nash equilibrium, each user selfishly routes its traffic on those links that minimize its expected latency cost. T...

Wardrop [1] introduced the famous user equilibrium principle for traffic network, which is a scalar equilibrium principle. Smith [2] investigated that a Wardrop's user equilibrium flow is equivalent to the solution of a class of variational inequalities when the travel cost function is a scalar function. Recently, many researchers have proposed equilibrium models based on multicriteria consider...

Stochastic user equilibrium is an important issue in the traffic assignment problems, tradition models for the stochastic user equilibrium problem are designed as mathematical programming problems. In this article, a Physaruminspired model for the probit-based stochastic user equilibrium problem is proposed. There are two main contributions of our work. On the one hand, the origin Physarum mode...