This paper studies competitive allocations under adverse selection. We first provide a general necessary and sufficient condition for entry on an inactive market to be unprofitable. then use this result characterize, active market, unique budget-balanced allocation implemented by tariff making additional trades with entrant Motivated the recursive structure of allocation, we finally show that i...

We show how optimal saving in a two-period model is affected when prudence and risk aversion of the underlying utility function change. Increasing prudence alone will induce higher savings only if, for certain combinations of the interest rate and the pure time discount rate, there is distributional neutrality between the two periods. Otherwise, changes of risk aversion that affect the distribu...

The existing superstar model (Rosen, 1981) does not require imperfect substitutes, and the convexity of total earnings with respect to talent is due to greater output for those with more talent. Our model explains why wages would increase at an increasing rate in talent. Imperfect substitutability between non-superstars and superstars with probabilistic production results in convexity in wage r...

This paper constructs a simple model to illustrate that the current food stamp subsidy scheme fails to achieve its aim due to the crowding-out effect. In particular, if the household income is sufficiently low, only the corner solution exists and full subsidy is needed. The optimal food stamp subsidy scheme is identified and the subsidy efficiency rate is introduced to measure the impact on foo...

Focusing theory hypothesizes a bias toward concentration according to which consumers prefer goods with one outstanding feature over those with several smaller sized upsides. In contrast to models of present-biased behavior, focusing theory prescribes also future-biased behavior if an option’s future reward is particularly outstanding. Our laboratory experiment yields substantial support for th...

This paper pits neoclassical theory against prospect theory by investigating several clean tests of the competing hypotheses. Consistent with previous work, the field experimental data suggest that prospect theory adequately organizes behavior among inexperienced consumers, whereas consumers with intense market experience behave largely in accordance with neoclassical predictions. The data indi...

This paper studies competition between firms when consumers observe a private signal of their preferences over products. Within the class structures that induce pure-strategy pricing equilibria, we derive are optimal for and those consumers. The firm-optimal policy amplifies underlying product differentiation, thereby relaxing competition, while ensuring purchase preferred product, maximizing t...

We introduce a search model where products differ in horizontal attributes and unobserved quality (“experience goods”), firms can establish reputation. show that the inability of consumers to observe before purchase significantly changes how frictions affect market performance. In equilibrium, higher costs reduce match values increase price but boost firms’ investment product quality. Under pla...

We explore how taste projection—the tendency to overestimate similar others’ tastes are one’s own—affects bidding in auctions. In first-price auctions with private values, projection leads bidders exaggerate the intensity of competition and, consequently, overbid—irrespective whether values independent, affiliated, or (a)symmetric. Moreover, optimal reserve price is lower than rational benchmar...

Elicitation mechanisms typically presume only money enters utility functions. However, nonmonetary objectives are confounders. In particular, psychologists argue people favor bets where ability is involved over equivalent random bets—a preference for control. Our new elicitation method mitigates control and determines that under the widely used matching probabilities method, subjects report bel...