We show that a bargaining game of alternating offers with exogenous risk of breakdown and played by dynamically consistent non-expected utility maximizers is formally equivalent to Rubinstein’s (1982) game with time preference. Within this game, the behavior of dynamically consistent players is indistinguishable from the behavior of expected utility maximizers. Journal of Economic Literature Cl...

The solubility of pristine fullerenes can be enhanced by mixing C60 and C70 due to the associated increase in configurational entropy. This "entropic dissolution" allows the preparation of field-effect transistors with an electron mobility of 1 cm(2) V(-1) s(-1) and polymer solar cells with a highly reproducible power-conversion efficiency of 6%, as well as a thermally stable active layer.

It is difficult to eliminate all market power in electricity markets and it is therefore frequently suggested that some market power should be tolerated: extra revenues contribute to fixed cost recovery, facilitate investment, and increase security of supply. This suggestion implicitly assumes all generation technologies benefit equally from market power. We assess a mixture of conventional and...

We extend the ‘no-haggling’ result of Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) to the class of linear multiproduct monopoly problems when the buyer’s valuations are smoothly distributed. In particular we show that there is no loss for the seller in optimizing over mechanisms such that all allocations belong to the boundary of the feasible set. The set of potentially optimal mechanisms can be further restric...

In this paper we analyze the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination when competitive pressure varies across markets. In particular, we study the economic aspects of the Robinson-Patman Act associated with the “meeting competition defense.” Using equilibrium models, the main result we find is that this defense might be used successfully in cases of primary line injury precisely whe...

Professional sports teams receive large public subsidies for new facility construction. Empirical research suggests that these subsidies cannot be justified by tangible or intangible economic benefits. We develop a model of bargaining between local governments and teams over subsidies that includes league expansion decisions. The model features loss aversion by fans that captures lost utility w...

This paper offers a new theory of destructive competition. We compare minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) to retail market clearing in a model with a monopolistic manufacturer selling to competitive retailers. In both the RPM and Flexible-Pricing Games, retailers must order inventories before the realization of demand uncertainty. We find that manufacturer profits and equilibrium inventories...

This paper analyses whether scale economies exists in the UK telecommunications industry. The approach employed differs from other UK studies in that panel data for a range of companies is used. This increases the number of observations and thus allows potentially for more robust tests for global subadditivity of the cost function. The main findings from the study reveal that although the resul...

Market makers in over-the-counter markets often make offsetting trades and have significant market power. We develop a market making model that captures this market feature as well as other important characteristics such as information asymmetry and inventory risk. In contrast to the existing literature, a market maker in our model can optimally shift some trade with the informed to other discr...

Wages and Productivity Growth in a Dynamic Monopoly* This Paper studies the intertemporal problem of a monopolistic firm that engages in productivity-enhancing innovations to reduce its labour costs. If the level of wages is sufficiently low, the firm’s rate of productivity growth approaches the rate of wage growth and eventually the firm reaches a steady state where its unit labour cost remain...