A SOLUTION METHOD FOR LINEAR RATIONAL EXPECTATION MODELS UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION
نویسندگان
چکیده
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Macroeconomic Dynamics
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1365-1005,1469-8056
DOI: 10.1017/s1365100509990897