A Stackelberg game for the Italian tax evasion problem
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract In this paper, we consider the problem of tax evasion, which occurs whenever an individual or business ignores laws. Fighting evasion is main task Economic and Financial Military Police, annually performs fiscal controls to track down prosecute evaders at national level. Due limited financial resources, inspector unable audit population entirely. article, propose a model assist Italian (Guardia di Finanza, G.d.F.) in allocating its budget among different clusters, via controller-controlled Stackelberg game. The G.d.F. seen as leader, while potential are segmented into classes according their sizes, set by regulatory framework. Numerical results on real case for year 2015 provided. Insights optimal number will have perform clusters discussed compared strategy implemented
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All opinions expressed here are those of the authors and not those of the Economics Education and Research Consortium Research dissemination by the EERC may include views on policy, but the EERC itself takes no institutional policy positions This paper considers the problem of determining the optimal taxation for a group of individuals with random, independent and identically distributed income...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Computational Management Science
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1619-6988', '1619-697X']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10287-021-00416-6