A theory of price adjustment under loss aversion
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Loss Aversion, Price and Quality*
The Spence model (1975) is extended so that customers’ utility depends on their disposition to the firm in addition to quantity and quality of the good consumed. Disposition is determined by customers’ perception of firm’s pricing and quality decisions, which perception is ‘reference dependent’. The profit maximising, efficient, and Ramsey price and quality combinations are derived. Adjustment ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.12.008