Achieving Efficiency in Dynamic Contribution Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Achieving Efficiency in Dynamic Contribution Games ∗
We analyze a dynamic contribution game to a public project, in which a group of agents exert costly effort over time to make progress on a project. The project progresses gradually, and it is completed once a pre-specified amount of progress has been made, at which point it generates a lump sum payoff. A standard result in these games is that equilibrium efforts are inefficiently low due to the...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160018