An Experiment on Cooperation in a CPR Game with a Disapproval Option

نویسندگان

چکیده

This paper studies the standard version of approval mechanism with two players in a common pool resource (CPR) extraction game. In case disapproval, Nash level is implemented. The investigates, experimentally, extent to which threat leads Pareto-improving levels. Through our experiment, we confirm effectiveness reducing CPR over-extraction. Although participants’ behavior mainly explained by rational thinking, inequity payoff can also motivate their behavior. Moreover, show that there neither an order effect nor framing effect. Finally, reduction persists when no longer place.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Games

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['2073-4336']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12040083