An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategy-Proof Voting Rules over Restricted Domains
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Economics
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0304-4068
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.01.003