Approximate composable truthful mechanism design
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Computer Science
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0304-3975
DOI: 10.1016/j.tcs.2016.02.025