Can Reminders of Rules Induce Compliance? Experimental Evidence from a Common Pool Resource Setting

Does Information Matter? Some Experimental Evidence from a Common-Pool Resource Game

This paper analyzes the effect of the availability of information about the payoff structure on the behavior of players in a Common-Pool Resource game. Six groups of six individuals played a complete information game, while other six groups played the same game but with no information about the payoff function. It will be shown that the patterns of investment decisions in both treatments are re...

What Motivates Common Pool Resource Users? Experimental Evidence from the Field

This paper develops and tests several models of pure Nash strategies of individuals who extract from a common pool resource when they are motivated by a combination of selfinterest and preferences for altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion and conformity. Using data from a series of common pool resource experiments conducted in three rural areas of Colombia, we test whether an econometric sum...

Governing the Spectrum Commons : a Framework for Rules Based on Principles of Common - Pool Resource Management

Regulation and Evolution of Harvesting Rules and Compliance in Common Pool Resources

The present paper models jointly the evolution of compliance to regulation and the evolution of the CPR stock in the context of an evolutionary process emerging from combining replicator dynamics, which describe the adoption of harvesting rules, with resource stock dynamics. This evolutionary approach characterizes the emergence of steady-state equilibrium harvesting rules or compliance levels ...

An intergenerational common pool resource experiment

Many renewable resources are in intergenerational common pools, exploited by one generation after another. In our experiment, the stock available to each generation depends on the extent of exploitation by previous generations and on resource’s growth rate, which is either ‘‘slow’’ or ‘‘fast.’’ Subjects show altruistic restraint in exploitation, but not enough to achieve the social optimum. The...