Coalition Agreements, Issue Attention, and Cabinet Governance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Binding Agreements II: Coalition Formation
The bargaining approach can be usefully applied to address some classical questions in cooperative game theory. One of these concerns the formation of coalitions and the writing of binding agreements among groups of players. Many years ago, Ronald Coase argued that such negotiations would invariably end in an efficient outcome, and that bargaining power — whatever that is — would be reflected i...
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We study coalition formation in “real time”, a situation in which coalition formation is intertwined with the ongoing receipt of pay-offs. Agreements are assumed to be permanently binding: They can only be altered with the full consent of existing signatories. For characteristic function games we prove that equilibrium processes—whether or not these are history dependent—must converge to effici...
متن کاملSupplementary Notes for “Coalition Formation With Binding Agreements”
In these notes we provide some supplementary results and discussion not included in the main text of the paper. In particular, we provide a proof of the existence of a Markovian equilibrium, the proof of Proposition 3, some examples for three-player games and further discussion of the efficiency result. We also provide the proof of the four player inefficiency example and construct an equilibri...
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IN 1995 when the WTO was established, it seemed to be final confirmation of the success of a system that had managed multilateral trade relations since 1947. It provided an institutional framework within which governments were not only able to negotiate reductions in trade barriers but also to bind themselves to rules of conduct that, in principle, were both universal and nondiscriminatory. Abo...
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The theoretical literature on common pool problems in fiscal policy suggests that government fragmentation increases public expenditures. In parliamentary regimes, the fragmentation hypothesis refers to (i) coalition governments and (ii) cabinet size. This paper explores the effect of coalition governments and cabinet size on public expenditures with panel data covering all 16 German States ove...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Comparative Political Studies
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0010-4140,1552-3829
DOI: 10.1177/0010414019830726