Combinatorial auctions: theory, experiments, and practice

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University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher, except for reading and browsing via the World Wide Web. Users are not permitted to mount this file on any network servers.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: 4OR

سال: 2018

ISSN: 1619-4500,1614-2411

DOI: 10.1007/s10288-018-0375-5