Competition and Relational Contracts: Evidence from Rwanda's Coffee Mills
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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We investigate the use of information in repeated principal-agent game and report three results. First, consistent with Kandori (1992), garbling signals within each period hurts the e¢ ciency of the game. Second, contrary to Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991), bundling signals across periods and then fully revealing them never increases the e¢ ciency of the game. Third, and most importantly, we ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3126448