Computational soundness of symbolic zero-knowledge proofs*
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Computational soundness of symbolic zero-knowledge proofs
The abstraction of cryptographic operations by term algebras, called Dolev-Yao models, is essential in almost all tool-supported methods for proving security protocols. Recently significant progress was made in proving that Dolev-Yao models offering the core cryptographic operations such as encryption and digital signatures can be sound with respect to actual cryptographic realizations and secu...
متن کاملComputational Soundness of Symbolic Zero-Knowledge Proofs: Weaker Assumptions and Mechanized Verification
Proofs of security protocols are known to be error-prone and, owing to the distributed-system aspects of multiple interleaved protocol runs, awkward for humans to make. Hence work towards the automation of such proofs started soon after the first protocols were developed. The actual cryptographic operations in such proofs were idealized into so-called symbolic models. While symbolic models trad...
متن کاملSymbolic Malleable Zero-knowledge Proofs
Zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs have become a central building block for a variety of modern security protocols, e.g., as ZK-SNARKs in Pinocchio (IEEE S&P 2013) and ADSNARK (IEEE S&P 2015). One of the reasons is that modern ZK constructions, such as the Groth-Sahai proof system, offer novel types of cryptographic flexibility: a participant is able to re-randomize existing ZK proofs to achieve, for i...
متن کاملA Computationally Sound, Symbolic Abstraction for Malleable Zero-knowledge Proofs
Zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs have become a central building block for a variety of modern security protocols. Modern ZK constructions, such as the Groth-Sahai proof system, offer novel types of cryptographic flexibility: a participant is able to re-randomize existing ZK proofs, e.g., to achieve unlinkability in anonymity protocols; she can hide public parts of a ZK proof statement to meet her pri...
متن کاملProofs of Zero Knowledge
We present a protocol for verification of “no such entry” replies from databases. We introduce a new cryptographic primitive as the underlying structure, the keyed hash tree, which is an extension of Merkle’s hash tree. We compare our scheme to Buldas et al.’s Undeniable Attesters and Micali et al.’s Zero Knowledge Sets. In the following, the term database refers to a system supplying the simpl...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Computer Security
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1875-8924,0926-227X
DOI: 10.3233/jcs-2009-0392