Cooperative games on intersection closed systems and the Shapley value
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cooperative Games : Core and Shapley Value
This article describes the basic elements of the cooperative approach to game theory, one of the two counterparts of the discipline. After the presentation of some basic definitions, the focus will be on the core and the Shapley value, two of the most central solution concepts in cooperative game theory. JEL classification: C7.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.01.005