Core and stable sets of exchange economies with externalities
نویسندگان
چکیده
It is known that the core of an economy with externalities may be empty. We consider two concepts dominance allow us to prove set formed by individually rational, Pareto optimal allocations stable and coincides that, consequently, non-empty.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory Bulletin
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['2196-1085', '2196-1093']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-022-00239-x