Costly network formation and regular equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Costly network formation and regular equilibria
We prove that for generic network-formation games where players incur a strictly positive cost to propose links the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets.
متن کاملNetwork formation under mutual consent and costly communication
We consider two different approaches to describe the formation of social networks under mutual consent and costly communication. First, we consider a network-based approach; in particular Jackson– Wolinsky’s concept of pairwise stability. Next, we discuss a non-cooperative game-theoretic approach, through a refinement of the Nash equilibria of Myerson’s consent game. This refinement, denoted as...
متن کاملThe Role of Trust in Costly Network Formation ∗
We consider game theoretic models of social network formation. In this paper we limit our investigation to game theoretic models of network formation that are based on individual actions only. Our approach is based on three simple and realistic principles: (1) Link formation is a binary process of consent. (2) Link formation is costly. (3) The class of network payoff functions should be as gene...
متن کاملNetwork-Formation Games with Regular Objectives
Classical network-formation games are played on a directed graph. Players have reachability objectives, and each player has to select a path satisfying his objective. Edges are associated with costs, and when several players use the same edge, they evenly share its cost. The theoretical and practical aspects of network-formation games have been extensively studied and are well understood. We in...
متن کاملExact and Approximate Equilibria for Optimal Group Network Formation
We consider a process called Group Network Formation Game, which represents the scenario when strategic agents are building a network together. In our game, agents can have extremely varied connectivity requirements, and attempt to satisfy those requirements by purchasing links in the network. We show a variety of results about equilibrium properties in such games, including the fact that the p...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.004