Credibility in second-price auctions: an experimental test
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract We provide the first direct test of how credibility an auction format affects bidding behavior and final outcomes. To do so, we conduct a series laboratory experiments where role seller is played by human subject who receives revenue from (depending on treatment) has agency to determine outcome auction. Contrary theoretical predictions, find that non-credible second-price fails converge first-price behavioral explanation for our results based sellers’ aversion rule-breaking, which confirmed additional experiment.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Experimental Economics
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['1386-4157', '1573-6938']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09802-0