DEFAULT: Cipher Level Resistance Against Differential Fault Attack

Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) is a well known cryptanalytic technique that exploits faulty outputs of an encryption device. Despite its popularity and similarity with the classical (DA), thorough analysis explaining DFA from designer’s point-of-view missing in literature. To best our knowledge, no immune block cipher at algorithmic level has been proposed so far. Furthermore, all countermeasures somehow depend on device/protocol or implementation such as duplication/comparison. As these are outside scope designer, we focus designing primitive which can protect own. We present first concept resistance does not rely any related assumption, nor it form duplication. Our construction simple, software/hardware friendly security scales up state size. It be plugged before and/or after (almost) symmetric key will ensure non-trivial search complexity against DFA. One component protection layer SBox linear structures. Such SBoxes have never used design they generally perform poorly differential attacks. argue fact represent interesting trade-off between good cryptographic properties resistance. proof concept, construct protecting layer, named DEFAULT-LAYER, full-fledged DEFAULT. solutions compare favorably to state-of-the-art, offering advantages over sophisticated duplication based like impeccable circuits/CRAFT infective countermeasures.