Delegated portfolio management with socially responsible investment constraints
نویسندگان
چکیده
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The European Journal of Finance
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1351-847X,1466-4364
DOI: 10.1080/1351847x.2011.579746