Does Kuhnians have to be anti-realists? Towards a realist reconception of Kuhn’s historiography

Abstract It is quite unequivocal that Kuhn was committed to (some version of) naturalism; he defended, especially in his later work, the autonomy of scientific rationality; and rejected correspondence theory truth, i.e., traditional realistic conception world’s mind-independence. In this paper, I argue these three philosophical perspectives form an uneasy triangle, for while it possible coherently defend each them separately or two combined, holding all leads incoherence. Hence, only option reject one a way both compatible with Kuhnian historiography philosophically fruitful. My purpose paper not exegetical. ambition sketch coherent framework which does justice Kuhn’s historiographical model change avoids costs relativism anti-naturalism. particular, favor following interconnected positions: (1) Given role anomalies model, latter satisfies fundamental conditions acknowledging mind-independence world: ‘irreducibility condition’ ‘objectivity condition’, (2) rejection notion ‘Archimedean platform’ entail truth-value beliefs doesn’t play explanation their change, (3) Adopting realism rationality within naturalistic framework. However, adopting liberal rather than eliminative naturalism.