Dynamic Quality Signaling with Hidden Actions, Second Version
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions
We develop general recursive methods to solve for optimal contracts in dynamic principal-agent environments with hidden states and hidden actions. In our baseline model, the principal observes nothing other than transfers. Nevertheless, optimal incentive-constrained insurance can be attained. Starting from a general mechanism with arbitrary communication, randomization, full history dependence,...
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In our paper “Dynamic Mechanism Design with Hidden Income and Hidden Actions,” we develop general recursive methods to solve for optimal contracts in dynamic principal-agent models with hidden income and hidden actions. This appendix provides the detailed derivations of all recursive formulations presented in the paper, as well as proofs for all propositions. Matthias Doepke: Department of Econ...
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I consider a situation in which a principal commits to a mechanism first and then agents choose unobservable actions before they draw their types. The agents’ actions affect not only their payoffs directly but also a distribution of private types as well. Thus, the distribution of types is determined endogenously rather than exogeneously unlike standard mechanism design literature. Then I exten...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2344236