Dynamics of a delayed duopoly game with bounded rationality
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamics of a delayed duopoly game with bounded rationality
A bounded rationality duopoly game with delay is formulated. Its dynamical evolution is analyzed. The existence of an economic equilibrium of the game is derived. The local stability analysis has been carried out. The analysis showed that firms using delayed bounded rationality have a higher chance of reaching a Nash equilibrium point. Numerical simulations were used to show bifurcation diagram...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical and Computer Modelling
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0895-7177
DOI: 10.1016/j.mcm.2010.06.011