Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Design a Contract! A Simple Principal-Agent Problem as a Classroom Experiment
We present a simple classroom principal-agent experiment that can effectively be used as a teaching device to introduce important concepts of organizational economics and contracting. In a first part, students take the role of a principal and design a contract that consists of a fixed payment and an incentive component. In the second part, students take the role of agents and decide on an effor...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2000
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.203290