Egalitarian-equivalence and the Pareto principle for social preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Egalitarian-equivalence and the Pareto principle for social preferences
When we construct social preferences, the Pareto principle is often in conflict with the equity criteria: there exist two allocations x and y such that x Pareto dominates y, but y is an equitable allocation whereas x is not. The efficiency-first principle requires to rank an allocation x higher than y if (i) x Pareto dominates y or (ii) x and y are Pareto-noncomparable and x is equitable wherea...
متن کاملTitle Egalitarian - Equivalence and the Pareto Principle for Social Preferences
When we construct social preferences, the Pareto principle is often in conflict with the equity criteria: there exist two allocations x and y such that x Pareto dominates y, but y is an equitable allocation whereas x is not. The efficiency-first principle requires to rank an allocation x higher than y if (i) x Pareto dominates y or (ii) x and y are Pareto-noncomparable and x is equitable wherea...
متن کاملPatient, Perfectly Pareto Preferences: Programming and the Precautionary Principle
Society is an aggregate of present and future generations. We study stochastic inter-generational programming problems in which similar treatment of generations in similar situations is possible. For such problems, all patient, inequality averse societal welfare functions that are perfectly Pareto responsive have the same optimal policies. When the outcomes of irreversible decisions are partial...
متن کاملEgalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information
We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler’s (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they ...
متن کاملMonotonicity and the Pareto Principle
The property of monotonicity, th criterion of (first-degree) income dominance and the Pareto principle appear frequently in the literature on the axiomatic approach to the welfare economics of income distribution. Sometimes these are regarded as almost interchangeable for practical purposes. However, as we shall show, this interchangeability arises because of other important assumptions that ar...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0310-2