منابع مشابه
On Mechanisms Eliciting Ordinal Preferences
When is a mechanism designer justified in only asking for ordinal information about preferences? Simple examples show that, even if the planner’s goal (expressed by a social choice correspondence, or SCC) depends only on ordinal information, eliciting cardinal information may help with incentives. However, if agents may be uncertain about their own cardinal preferences, then a strong robustness...
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Abstract. We design experiments to jointly elicit risk and time preferences for the adult Danish population. We find that joint elicitation results in estimates of discount rates that are dramatically lower than those found in previous studies. Estimation of latent time preferences requires that one specify a theoretical structure to understand risk and time choices, but we show that our main r...
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A behavioral dataset contains various preference orderings displayed by the same individual in different payoff-irrelevant circumstances. We introduce a framework for eliciting the individual’s underlying preferences in such cases, in which it is conjectured that the variation in the observed preference orderings is the outcome of some cognitive process that distorts the underlying preferences....
متن کاملEliciting Stakeholder Preferences for Requirements Prioritization
Requirements engineering is a very critical phase in software development process. Requirements can be interpreted as basic decision alternatives which have to be negotiated by stakeholders. In this paper we present the results of an empirical study which focused on the analysis of key influence factors of successful requirements prioritization. This study has been conducted within the scope of...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0957-8765,1573-7888
DOI: 10.1007/s11266-012-9347-0