Endogenous Firm Efficiency in a Cournot Principal-Agent Model
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1993
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1993.1028