Entropy and equilibrium via games of complexity*1
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0378-4371
DOI: 10.1016/s0378-4371(04)00393-0