Equilibrium Departures from Common Knowledge in Games with Non-Additive Expected Utility

Expected Utility with Purely Subjective Non-additive Probabilities

Acts are functions from the set of states of the world into the set of consequences. Savage proposed axioms regarding a binary relation on the set of acts which are necessary and sufftcient for it to be representable by the functional gu(.)dP for some real-valued (utility) function u on the set of consequences and a (probability) measure P on the set of states of the world. The Ellsberg paradox...

Subjective Expected Utility in Games

The specification of a payoff function for each player is all that is needed to define a game with complete information in the usual way, the interpretation of a player’s payoffs being that they are von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities. But the latter axiomatic derivation was devised for single person decision problems involving objective lotteries over outcomes, and thus it seems not completely a...

Non-expected Utility Theory

The expected utility/subjective probability model of risk preferences and beliefs has long been the preeminent model of individual choice under conditions of uncertainty. It exhibits a tremendous flexibility in representing aspects of attitudes toward risk, has a well-developed analytical structure, and has been applied to the analysis of gambling, games of strategy, incomplete information, ins...

Equilibrium existence and uniqueness in network games with additive preferences

Non-Additive Security Games

Security agencies have found security games to be useful models to understand how to better protect their assets. The key practical elements in this work are: (i) the attacker can simultaneously attack multiple targets, and (ii) different targets exhibit different types of dependencies based on the assets being protected (e.g., protection of critical infrastructure, network security, etc.). How...