Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition∗
We describe a two-step algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the assumption that behavior is consistent with Markov perfect equilibrium. In the first step, the policy functions and the law of motion for the state variables are estimated. In the second step, the remaining structural parameters are estimated using the optimality conditions for equilibrium. The second step estimator is a si...
متن کاملEquilibrium analysis of dynamic models of imperfect competition
Motivated by recent developments in applied dynamic analysis, this paper presents new sufficient conditions for the existence of Markov perfect equilibrium in dynamic stochastic games. The main results imply the existence of Markov perfect equilibrium provided the sets of actions are compact, the set of states is countable, the period payoff functions are upper semi continuous on the action pro...
متن کاملEmpirical Models of Imperfect Competition: A Discussion
* We wish to thank Ignacio Esponda, Igal Hendel, and Jon Levin for comments. Einav gratefully acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation and the hospitality of the Hoover Institution. Nevo gratefully acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation and the Sloan Foundation. By Liran Einav Stanford University and NBER and Aviv Nevo Northwestern Univers...
متن کاملModels of Imperfect Competition in Analysis of Siberian Electricity Market
The paper considers mechanisms for organizing free trade in the electricity market that are based on submitting bids of energy consumers and producers to the market operator. The authors discuss and compare possible strategies of generator behavior that lead to different equilibrium situations and correspond to Cournot model and the models of supply function equilibria, and a perfectly competit...
متن کاملSignaling with Imperfect Competition*
We analyze a duopoly model where rms sell conspicuous goods to horizontallyand vertically-di¤erentiated consumers. These consumers care about both the intrinsic quality of the goods they purchase as well as the social statusconveyed by these goods (namely, the social inference of their hidden wealth based on their purchase). Firms o¤er non-linear price and quality schedules that, in e¤ect, s...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0012-9682,1468-0262
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00796.x