Evidential Equilibria: Heuristics and Biases in Static Games of Complete Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Evidential equilibria: Heuristics and biases in static games of complete information Working Paper Version
Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it diffi cult to explain the empirical evidence from a large number of static games including the prisoners’dilemma game, the hawk-dove game, voting games, public goods games and oligopoly games. Under uncertainty about what others will do in one-shot games, evidence suggests that people often use evidential reasoning (ER), i.e., they assign dia...
متن کاملEvidential Equilibria: Heuristics and Biases in Static Games of Complete Information
Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it difficult to explain the empirical evidence from a large number of static games, including the prisoners’ dilemma game, the hawk-dove game, voting games, public goods games and oligopoly games. Under uncertainty about what others will do in one-shot games, evidence suggests that people often use evidential reasoning (ER), i.e., they assign di...
متن کاملEvidential equilibria: Heuristics and biases in static games
Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it diffi cult to explain the empirical evidence in a large number of static games such as prisoners’ dilemma, voting, public goods, oligopoly, etc. Under uncertainty about what others will do in one-shot games of complete and incomplete information, evidence suggests that people often use evidential reasoning (ER), i.e., they assign diagnostic s...
متن کاملEvidential Equilibria in Static Games: Heuristics and Biases in Strategic Interaction
Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it diffi cult to explain the empirical evidence for a large number of static games such as prisoner’s dilemma, voting, public goods, oligopoly, etc. Under uncertainty about what others will do in one-shot games of complete and incomplete information, evidence suggests that people often use evidential reasoning (ER), i.e., they assign diagnostic ...
متن کاملQuantum Correlated Equilibria in Classical Complete Information Games
Since the work of Aumann [1], the concept of correlated equilibrium (CE) has played an important role in the study of games. Correlated equilibria always exist, and unlike Nash equilibria, which are believed to be computational intractable (see [5]), a correlated equilibrium can be computed efficiently in a broad class of succinctly-representable games [19]. In a correlated equilibrium, a trust...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2844471