Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government and Enterprise Behavior Strategies in Public-Private-Partnership Farmland Consolidation

To improve the implementation effect of farmland consolidation (FC) and promote development agricultural modernization, Chinese government has vigorously promoted application public-private-partnership for (PPP-FC). However, many conflicts interest among stakeholders exist in PPP-FC. Especially stage PPP-FC, most private enterprises probably prefer to decrease costs construction increase profits when incentives supervision are insufficient. Based on this, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between explore motivations enterprises’ speculative behaviors, interaction mechanism stability strategies both parties uses numerical simulations visually analyze effectiveness incentive strategic change sides. Our results show that (1) enterprise’s operating income is decisive factor affects behavioral choices: situation a low-effort strategy greater than high-effort root cause behavior; (2) can simultaneously affect decision-making direction speed enterprises, especially punishment which effectively regulate behaviors enterprises; (3) regulation officials’ desire promotion important factors affecting their negatively impact government’s plans adopt positively promotes implementing measures (4) level farmers choices enterprises: effective remedy inadequate constrains behavior. Finally, proposes corresponding policy recommendations PPP-FC also provides reference other developing countries formulate mechanisms.