Evolutionary implementation in aggregative games
نویسندگان
چکیده
Due to externalities, the equilibrium behavior in aggregative games is not efficient sense of maximizing aggregate payoff. We characterize conditions such that efficiency can be globally implemented under evolutionary dynamics. If payoffs satisfy certain important concavity conditions, then payoff function these has a unique maximizer. Once planner imposes transfer equal externality generated by agents, we obtain new adjusted game. This potential game with original being its function. Evolutionary dynamics converge maximizer this function, thereby implementing Our earlier paper on public goods (Lahkar and Mukherjee, 2019) emerges as an example present general analysis. Two applications are bads tragedy commons.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1879-3118', '0165-4896']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.11.004