Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis regarding strategic interaction under expectation-based loss-aversion. First, we develop a coherent framework for the analysis by extending the equilibrium concepts of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) to strategic interaction and demonstrate how to derive equilibria. Second, we delineate how expectation-based loss-averse players differ in their strateg...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.010