Experimental tests for gender effects in a principal-agent game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Behavioral Public Administration
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2576-6465
DOI: 10.30636/jbpa.21.29