Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Generalised weakened fictitious play
A general class of adaptive process in games is developed, which significantly generalises weakened fictitious play (Van der Genugten, 2000) and includes several interesting fictitious-play-like processes as special cases. The general model is rigorously analysed using the best response differential inclusion, and shown to converge in games with the fictitious play property. Furthermore, a new ...
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What modern game theorists describe as “fictitious play” is not the learning process George W. Brown defined in his 1951 paper. His original version differs in a subtle detail, namely the order of belief updating. In this note we revive Brown’s original fictitious play process and demonstrate that this seemingly innocent detail allows for an extremely simple and intuitive proof of convergence i...
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We investigate how well continuous-time fictitious play in two-player games performs in terms of average payoff, particularly compared to Nash equilibrium payoff. We show that in many games, fictitious play outperforms Nash equilibrium on average or even at all times, and moreover that any game is linearly equivalent to one in which this is the case. Conversely, we provide conditions under whic...
متن کاملA New Kind of Fictitious Play
Gass, Zafra, and Qiu (1996) introduce a modified version of fictitious play for matrix gameswhere only themore successful player’s strategy is retained.This paper introduces additional modifications that appear to converge faster. c © 2001 JohnWiley & Sons, Inc.* Naval Research Logistics 48: 270–280, 2001
متن کاملFictitious play in coordination games
We study the Fictitious Play process with bounded and unbounded recall in pure coordination games for which failing to coordinate yields a payoff of zero for both players. It is shown that every Fictitious Play player with bounded recall may fail to coordinate against his own type. On the other hand, players with unbounded recall are shown to coordinate (almost surely) against their own type as...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 1993
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1006/game.1993.1011