Harsanyi power solutions for graph-restricted games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Harsanyi power solutions for graph-restricted games
We consider cooperative transferable utility games, or simply TU-games, with limited communication structure in which players can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the communication graph. Solutions for such graph games can be obtained by applying standard solutions to a modified or restricted game that takes account of the cooperation restrictions. We discuss Harsanyi solutions wh...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-009-0220-3